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and force mentorship. A recurring
theme is the failure of a top-heavy bureaucracy of “big military/Army/Navy”
that is “organizationally miscast for
dealing with twenty-first-century insurgencies,” versus smaller, more efficient
Marine, special forces, and civil affairs
units. One example is the transformation of “big military” control over the
Afghanistan battlefield. In 2001, master
sergeants were empowered to call in
B-52 airstrikes that arrived within minutes; by 2003, approval of task force
concepts of operations required three
days of paperwork and senior-officer
authorization.
Kaplan holds out the ethnic composition and language skills of U.S. Southern Command personnel as exemplary.
He posits that, for the twenty-first century, “indigenous culture must be appreciated before anything can be
accomplished with its inhabitants” and
that “cultural and historical knowledge
of the terrain is more likely than technological wizardry to dilute the so-called
fog-of-war.” Kaplan states that in Afghanistan the “American Empire . . . was
weakest” because of an absence of linguistic skills among deployed military
personnel. “This . . . neglected part of . . .
defense ‘transformation’ . . . had nothing
to do with the latest weapons systems.”
According to Kaplan, future military
operations should optimally leave small
footprints. In the Philippines, he observes, Army civil affairs teams, part of
the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, functioned like relief charities or
nongovernmental organizations—they
built schools, dug wells, and provided
medical assistance. These personnel
“represented the future reality of Special Operations: the Peace Corps with
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guns, the final articulation of unconventional war.”
Contrary to media reports of poor military morale due to overdeployment,
Kaplan states that “with Army Special
Forces and the Marines I had met only
two kinds of troops (from 2002–2004):
those who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those who were jealous
of those who were” and “those in the
Special Operations community whom I
had met (in the Philippines) and in
eastern Afghanistan were having the
time of their lives.”
Imperial Grunts is intended to be the
first of several books on “imperial
maintenance on the ground, and seeking a rule book for its application.” The
strong opinions of the author notwithstanding, those desiring to learn about
military personnel deployed worldwide
in the war on terror can benefit from
reading this account.
ZYGMUNT F. DEMBEK

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve

Parrish, Thomas. The Submarine: A History. New
York: Penguin, 2004. 576pp. $17

In this excellent and rather lengthy
book, Thomas Parrish uses detailed vignettes to illustrate how submarines,
the men who operated them, and the
organizations that produced them
changed naval warfare between great
powers during the twentieth century.
The author does this with a deft hand,
providing a wealth of details concerning
many notable personalities and technical facts of his arcane subject in a way
that both informs and entertains. One
has only to read the first three pages,
which quickly discuss the short and
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tragic life of the Confederate submarine
CSS H. L. Hunley, to get an accurate
feel for how the rest of the book will
progress. Parrish maintains this fast
pace as he relates the legend of David
Bushnell’s Revolutionary War submersible vessel, the Turtle; Robert Fulton’s
submarine efforts; and those of other
early inventors. His discussions on
World War I are more substantial, and
his penchant for detail emerges in his
short biographies of some of the major
figures of the time. He ties their careers
to submarine technology, not only describing Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s
rise to high command in the German
navy but quoting the admiral’s observation that his success was bound to the
development of the torpedo. Parrish
then traces the development of both the
German and British fleets and the grand
strategies that led to their acquisition.
For the next ten pages, we are told the
riveting story of how Lieutenant Otto
Weddigen, commanding the sixhundred-ton submarine U-9, with a
crew of twenty-six men, sank the British cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue
with just three torpedoes in less than
two hours in the early days of the war.
In that battle 1,459 British men died,
which at the time represented the worst
butcher’s bill, and arguably the most
stunning defeat, in the history of the
Royal Navy. As Parrish later observes, the
century of the submarine had arrived.
Parrish treats his discussion of World
War II equally well. He relays, among
other things, Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
rise, U-47 commander Lieutenant
Günter Prien’s attack in Scapa Flow, the
U.S. Navy’s participation in convoy escort duty before the official declaration
of war, and the second Battle of the Atlantic. He discusses the parallel Allied
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and German code-breaking efforts and
the action/reaction technology cycle between submarines and those who
hunted them. Readers with an interest
in the U.S. submarine force’s contributions to victory against Japan will be
pleased with the author’s treatment of
that important campaign and of the
major figures involved.
If the book has a weakness, it is that
some important points receive scant
coverage. All told, nearly four hundred
pages of the book discuss the history of
diesel-powered submarines, while only
eighty-four pages are dedicated to nuclear boats. Yet even here the author
does a creditable job in describing the
development of American nuclear submarines, evenhandedly discussing the
rise, behavior, strengths, and weaknesses of Admiral Hyman Rickover.
Oddly, Russian submarines receive little
attention, most of it devoted to peacetime losses of the Komsolomets (the
Mike-class submarine) in 1989 and that
of the Kursk (an Oscar II) in 2000.
Submarine accidents also present the
few stumbling points. Parrish states
that all hands were lost when HMS
Thetis sank in 1939, when in fact three
members of the crew and a shipyard
worker escaped from the stricken submarine. Similarly, he describes the USS
Scorpion as “shabby and seedy” and
“rickety,” citing these alleged characteristics as contributing to its loss. However, these oversights are relatively
minor and do not significantly detract
from what is otherwise a fine treatment
of a complex subject. The book will appeal to the interested layman, naval
professional, and, especially, to current
and former submariners.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

U. S. Naval War College
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